

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 15345 01 OF 04 101501Z

51

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 EA-11 NEA-10 IO-14 ISO-00 ACDA-19 OMB-01 SAJ-01

CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04

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INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

USMISSION BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

DIA WASHDC

USMISSION GENEVA

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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AMEMBASSY PARIS

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION USUN

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY BONN

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 15345 01 OF 04 101501Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 MOSCOW 15345

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, UR, US

SUBJ: YEAR-END ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICY

1. SUMMARY: LOOKING TOWARD 1974, WE CONCLUDE THAT THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO BE A PRIMARY PREOCCUPATION OF SOVIET POLICY. THE BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP SEEKS NOT ONLY TECHNOLOGICAL UPLIFT AT HOME BUT ALSO A DEGREE OF U.S.-SOVIET PARTNERSHIP WHICH WILL FURTHER SOVIET OBJECTIVES ABROAD. MOST OF THE PAY-OFF IS STILL MORE POTENTIAL THAN REAL, HOWEVER, AND THE BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP IN JUSTIFYING ITS POLICY HAS TENDED TO LEAN HEAVILY ON CITING POSSIBILITIES FOR THE FUTURE. IT ALSO FLAUNTS THE AMERICAN CONNECTION TO PROPAGANDIZE THE VIEW THAT THE USSR HAS ATTAINED EQUAL STATUS AS THE OTHER SUPERPOWER. BUT SOME ELEMENTS HERE PROBABLY WANT MORE CURRENT PROOF THAT DETENTE CAN YIELD DIVIDENDS. MIDDLE EAST EVENTS SHOW THAT WHEN FACED WITH CRITICAL SITUATIONS INVOLVING MAJOR SOVIET INTERESTS, BREZHNEV MAY TRY, EVEN AT THIS EARLY DATE AND EVEN AT SOME RISK, TO CASH IN ON HIS AMERICAN CONNECTION.

2. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMING YEAR MAY GIVE FRESH ARGUMENTS TO THOSE SOVIETS WHO ARGUE THAT "YOU CAN'T COUNT ON THE AMERICANS." FOR EXAMPLE, MFN - AND PERHAPS CREDITS - MAY FOUNDER ON FREE EMIGRATION. BACKLASH FROM THE OIL EMBARGO COULD FURTHER PREJUDICE THE CASE IN THE U.S. AGAINST EVEN PARTIAL RELIANCE ON SIBERIAN ENERGY. WATERGATE DEVELOPMENTS MAY CONTINUE TO RAISE DOUBTS. ANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS OVER BERLIN, CSCE, MBFR, OR INDOCHINA, FOR EXAMPLE, OR A NEW OUTBREAK OF TROUBLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WOULD PROBABLY YIELD FURTHER PROOF THAT THE U.S. WILL PURSUE ITS OWN VITAL

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 15345 01 OF 04 101501Z

INTERESTS REGARDLESS OF THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. BREZHNEV AND HIS COLLABORATORS MAY HAVE TO EXTEND THEMSELVES IN ORDER TO CONVINCE DOUBTERS TO KEEP THEIR EYES ON THE LONG-TERM ADVANTAGES OF THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. AND TO IGNORE THE SHORT-TERM DISAPPOINTMENTS.

3 THE MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR U.S. POLICY REMAIN TO

CONVINCE THE SOVIETS (A) THAT IT IS BOTH FEASIBLE AND IN THEIR INTEREST TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, AND (B) THAT IT IS DANGEROUS AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO ATTEMPT TO TURN THE RELATIONSHIP AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE U.S. OR ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES. END SUMMARY.

4. BREZHNEV'S DETENTE POLICY DEMONSTRABLY OFFERS SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES FOR THE USSR, WHICH IS PRESUMABLY WHY HE TOOK IT AS HIS POLITICAL PLATFORM AND WAS ABLE TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS IN SUPPORT OF IT. INPOLITICAL TERMS, IT PROVIDES SOME REASSURANCE AGAINST WHAT IS SEEN AS A LONG-TERM THREAT FROM CHINA, A MEANS OF INHIBITING THE INCIPIENT MOVEMENT TOWARD A SEPARATE EUROPEAN MILITARY ENTITY, AND A POSSIBILITY - UNDER THE AEGIS OF A HOPED-FOR U.S.-SOVIET CONDOMINIUM - OF EXPANDING SOVIET INFLUENCE TO THE SOUTH. IN TERMS OF DEVELOPING THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF SOVIET POWER, IT PROMISES TO HELP CLOSE THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND PRODUCTION GAP, TO CHANNEL INCREASING INCREMENTS OF RESOURCES TO CIVILIAN RATHER THAN MILITARY PRODUCTION TO THE SAME END, AND TO PERMIT EXPANDED RELIANCE ON FOREIGN FUNDING AND FOREIGN-MADE PRODUCTION FACILITIES TO HELP EASE DOMESTIC PRESSURE FOR CONSUMER GOODS. IN MILITARY TERMS, IT PROMISES TO STABILIZE AND INSTITUTIONALIZE NUCLEAR PARITY.

5. NEVERTHELESS THE POLICY GIVES RISE TO QUESTIONING. HINTS BY USA INSTITUTE DIRECTOR ARBATOV, AMONG OTHERS, THAT THERE ARE SKEPTICS OF DETENTE IN THE SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT ARE, OF COURSE, SELF-SERVING: THEY BACK UP HIS SALES TALK THAT IF WE MISS THIS OPPORTUNITY FOR GOOD RELATIONS IT MAY BE A LONG TIME BEFORE WE GET

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PAGE 04 MOSCOW 15345 01 OF 04 101501Z

ANOTHER CHANCE. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THE FEW SIGNS AVAILABLE (SHELEST'S FALL, SUSLOV'S SPEECHES, THE PROPAGANDISTS' VEILED DISTASTE FOR BREZHNEV'S "VICTORY THROUGH CONTACTS" THEME) ARE SUFFICIENT, IN THIS CLOSED SOCIETY, TO CONCLUDE THAT OPINIONS ON DETENTE ARE INDEED VARIED. NO RESPONSIBLE SOVIET LEADER WOULD REJECT OUTRIGHT ALL THE FRUITS OF DETENTE. BUT WE FEEL CERTAIN THAT SOME LEADERSHIP ELEMENTS QUESTION THE PRICE TO BE PAID IN TERMS OF DOMESTIC CONTROL AND FOREIGN POLICY RESTRAINT. SOME PROBABLY QUESTION THE PACE OF CONCESSIONS (E.G. IN JEWISH EMIGRATION, JAMMING CESSATION). AND SOME UNDOUBTEDLY WANT TO SEE IMMEDIATE AND CONCRETE BENEFITS RATHER THAN MERE PROMISES FOR THE FUTURE.

6. BREZHNEV'S POSITION AT HOME SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED. A SHUFFLE IN THE POLITIBURO ADDED THREE BREZHNEV SUPPORTERS WITH LINES OUT TO IMPORTANT CONSTITUENCIES (PARTICULARLY THE MILITARY AND SECRET POLICE) WHILE REMOVING TWO VOICES WHICH WERE OUT OF TUNE WITH BREZHNEV'S POLICIES. THE ECONOMY TOOK AN UPTURN, DUE LARGELY TO A RECORD WHEAT CROP (WHICH PARADOXICALLY MAY HAVE SAVED THE NECK OF POLYANSKIY, A BREZHNEV RIVAL). THE 1974 PLAN MAY BE REVISED UPWARD, AND KOSYGIN HAS HELD OUT HOPE OF AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE CONSUMER SECTOR NEXT YEAR. NEVERTHELESS, THE

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 15345 02 OF 04 101625Z

51

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OC\*-01 EA-11 NEA-10 IO-14 ISO-00 ACDA-19 OMB-01 SAJ-01

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USLO PEKING  
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USMISSION USUN  
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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 15345 02 OF 04 101625Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 MOSCOW 15345

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, UR, US

SUBJ: YEAR-END ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICY

LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PROBLEMS REMAIN. AND THERE MAY BE  
DIFFICULT DECISIONS REGARDING JEWISH EMIGRATION,  
DISSENT AND FOREIGN CONTACTS. THESE DECISIONS COULD  
FIND "MODERNIZERS" IN THE LEADERSHIP LINED UP AGAINST  
CONSERVATIVES, WITH POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR DETENTE.

7. LOOKING ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF FOREIGN POLICY  
ISSUES, THE SOVIETS CAN SEE AMPLE PROBLEMS IN THE YEAR  
AHEAD, VIRTUALLY ALL BEARING ON DETENTE:

A. THE U.S. GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. REMAIN AT  
THE CORE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. BUT THERE SEEMS LESS  
CONFIDENCE HERE ABOUT THE U.S.'S RELIABILITY AS A  
PARTNER. THIS IS NOT MERELY A FUNCTION OF THE MIDDLE  
EAST EVENTS. THE TRAVAIL OF MFN -- AND THE THREAT TO  
CREDITS -- MUST BE CAUSING SOME SOVIET REAPPRAISAL OF  
THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH  
VIS-A-VIS CONGRESS. THE NEW NOTE OF ANXIETY -- BOTH  
AMONG OUR INTERLOCUTORS AND IN THE PRESS -- ABOUT THE  
FATE OF THE PRESIDENT AS WATERGATE REFUSES TO GO AWAY  
REFLECTS IN PART THEIR PERSONALIZATION OF DETENTE.  
THESE AND OTHER CONCERNS -- THE CONTINUING AGITATION  
WITHIN THE U.S. ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS AND JEWISH EMIGRA-  
TION, THE BUDGETING OF NEW U.S. WEAPONS SYSTEMS, THE  
POSSIBILITY THAT THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO WILL TURN ALL  
AMERICAN ENERGY INVESTMENTS INWARD TO THE POINT OF

SCOTCHING JOINT EFFORTS TO DEVELOP SIBERIAN GAS  
RESOURCES--MAY WELL FEED DOUBTS REGARDING THE DEGREE  
TO WHICH THE AMERICAN POWER STRUCTURE IS READY AND  
ABLE TO EMBARK ON A PERMANENT, NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 15345 02 OF 04 101625Z

THE SOVIET UNION. GIVEN THESE FOREBODINGS, THERE MAY  
BE A GROWING TENDENCY BY SOME SOVIET LEADERS TO GIVE  
LITMUS-PAPER IMPORTANCE TO SUCH INDIVIDUAL FACTORS AS  
WHAT CONGRESS DECIDES ON CREDITS, NOW FAST CONCRETE  
ECONOMIC DEALS ARE CONSUMMATED AND HOW GRACEFULLY THE  
U.S. ACCEPTS A GREATER SOVIET POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT IN  
THE MIDDLE EAST.

B. FRG. THE ADMISSION OF THE TWO GERMANIES TO THE UN  
MARKED THE CLOS OF A REMARKABLE PHASE IN FRG-USSR  
RELATIONS BEGINNING WITH THE BILATERAL TREATY OF 1970  
AND SPANNING THE BERLIN AGREEMENT AND BREZHNEV'S VISIT  
TO BONN IN MAY 1973 THE NEXT PHASE MAY BE MARKED MORE  
BY PROBLEMS THAN BY PROGRESS. THE SOVIETS MAY FINALLY  
BE BEGINNING TO WORRY THAT -- AS WE NOTED IN OUR  
ASSESSMENT A YEAR AGO -- THEIR PRO-BRANDT POLICY HAS  
HELPED PLANT THE SEEDS OF GERMAN RESURGENCE IN EUROPE.  
THE HARDER SOVIET LINE OVER LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND OTHER  
BERLIN-RELATED ISSUES MAY NOT BE SOLELY A PRODUCT OF  
GDR PRESSURE, BUT MAY ALSO REFLECT SOVIET CONCERN TO  
KEEP THE FRG IN ITS PLACE. MOSCOW PROBABLY PREFERS  
CONTINUED GDR-FRG ESTRANGEMENT, AND DOES NOT MIND  
SEEING BERLIN REMAIN A BONE OF CONTENTION BETWEEN THEM  
SO LONG AS FOUR-POWER CONFRONTATIONS ARE AVOIDED. THE  
SOVIET EFFORT TO INCLUDE FRG FORCES IN THE FIRST STAGE  
OF MBFR IS A REMINDER OF THE CONTINUED SOVIET PRE-  
OCCUPATION OVER BONN'S MILITARY STRENGTH -- A  
PREOCCUPATION WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY GROW IN PROPORTION  
TO BONN'S INCREASING INTEREST IN WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE  
COOPERATION.

C. JAPAN. THE TANAKA VISIT TO MOSCOW WAS A MAJOR STEP  
FORWARD FOR BOTH COUNTRIES. BUT IT ALSO REVEALED THE  
DEPTH OF THEIR DISAGREEMENT ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES.  
SOVIET OBSESSION WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE FRONTIERS  
(APPARENT ALSO IN THEIR CSCE EMPHASIS ON INVIOABILITY  
OF FRONTIERS) WILL MAKE COMPROMISE ON THE NORTHERN  
TERRITORIES DIFFICULT FOR MOSCOW. SO ALSO WILL THE  
DANGEROUS PRECEDENT WHICH RETURN OF THE ISLANDS WOULD  
SET FOR MOSCOW'S BORDER PROBLEMS WITH PEKING.

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PAGE 04 MOSCOW 15345 02 OF 04 101625Z

D. THE EC. GIVEN THE INITIAL EC REACTION TO CEMA'S PROBES AND THE INHERENT WEAKNESS OF THE CEMA MECHANISM, SOVIET EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO ECONOMIC BLOCS SEEM UNLIKELY TO \*OVE VERY FAST OR GET VERY FAR. MOREOVER, SOVIET ENDORSEMENT OF THE ARABS' USE OF THE OIL WEAPON AGAINST EUROPE COULD HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON SOVIET RELATIONS WITH A NUMBER OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, NOT TO MENTION JAPAN.

E. MBFR. IT IS STIL DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE R LE THE VIENNA TALKS PLAY IN SOVIET POLICY. WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE INTERESTED IN MBFR PRIMARILY AS A DEVICE TO EASE THE U.S. OUT OF EUROPE GRADUALLY, WITHOUT THE SHOCK OF A MANSFIELD UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL, WHICH MIGHT STIMULATE THE EMERGENCE OF A EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY. ADDITIONALLY, THEY SEE ANY REDUCTIONS OF INDIGENOUS TROOPS -- E.G. WEST GERMANS FOR CZECHS -- AS A DOUBLE GAIN FOR THE USSR.

F. CSCE. MUCH OF THE BLOOM IS OFF CSCE FOR THE SOVIETS, WHO NOW FIND THEMSELVES ON THE DEFENSIVE AND REDUCED TO DAMAGE-LIMITING IN GENEVA. BUT IT WOULD TAKE DESPERATION CAUSED BY WEST EUROPEAN INTRANSIGENCE ON BASKET THREE TO CAUSE THEM TO DISOWN THE CONFERENCE ALTOGETHER. THEIR OPTIMUM OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO GENERATE AS MUCH EUPHORIA AS POSSIBLE, HOPEFULLY WITH A CONCLUDING SUMMIT WHICH WILL ADOPT FINAL DOCUMENTS CONFIRMING THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE STATUS QUO AND MAKING A BOW TO WESTERN DESIDERATA SO AS TO FEED THE EUPHORIA.

G. HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONTACTS. THE PROCESS OF DETENTE HAS THRUST HUMANITARIAN ISSUES INTO THE FOREFRONT OF SOVIET MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN. THE SOVIETS ARE HAVING TO COPE WITH A WHOLE NEW RANGE OF PROBLEMS: BASKET THREE AT CSCE,

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 15345 03 OF 04 101636Z

51  
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 EA-11 NEA-10 IO-14 ISO-00 ACDA-19 OMB-01 SAJ-01

CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 15345 03 OF 04 101636Z

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FAMILY REUNIFICATION QUESTIONS, JEWISH EMIGRATION, THE WORLDWIDE CONSTITUENCY OF DISSIDENTS SUCH AS SAKHAROV. DETENTE ITSELF DEPENDS PARTLY ON HOW THE SOVIETS HANDLE THESE QUESTIONS. THE SOVIET DILEMMA -- HOW TO RECONCILE WESTERN DEMANDS IN THOSE FIELDS WITH THE PRESERVATION OF A TIGHT INTERNAL SECURITY SYSTEM -- IS BOUND TO INCREASE AS DETENTE PROCEEDS FROM ATMOSPHERICS TO SPECIFIC COOPERATION. THIS IS A VITAL ISSUE FOR THE SOVIET SECURITY APPARATUS AND THEREFORE HIGHLY VOLATILE IN ITS POTENTIAL FOR DIVIDING THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

8. BREZHNEV'S GROWING PERSONAL CULT IS DEEPLY ROOTED IN DETENTE, AND HE PERSONALLY SEEMS FULLY COMMITTED TO IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. NEVERTHELESS HE CONTINUES TO ADD OTHER STRINGS TO HIS BOW. HE TRAVELLED TO NON-ALIGNED INDIAN FOR A VISIT THAT WAS HEAVILY PUBLICIZED IN THE SOVIET PRESS. HE CONTINUED TO DOMINATE RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST LEADERS. HE IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT CUBA LATER THIS MONTH WHERE HE CAN REAFFIRM SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE SOCIALIST AND NON-ALIGNED WORLD (AND, IF HE CHOOSES, ASSERT THEM SPECIFICALLY IN LATIN AMERICA). AND DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS HE HEADED THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING TEAM, SHUTTING OUT BOTH KOSYGIN AND PODGORNYY, WHO HAVE PLAYED MIDDLE EAST ROLES IN THE PAST. BREZHNEV APPARENTLY WISHES TO SHOW THAT HE IS NOT A ONE-ISSUE LEADER. HE MAY BRANCH OUT FURTHER IN 1974. VISITS TO THE MIDDLE EAST, TO EAST ASIA  
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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 15345 03 OF 04 101636Z

(TO PLUMP FOR THE SOVIET ASIAN SECURITY IDEA), AND TO SOME THIRD WORLD CAPITALS SEEM POSSIBLE.

8. APART FROM THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST, OTHER MAJOR AREAS OF SOVIET CONCERN IN THE COMING YEAR INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

A. COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. TWO RELATED ISSUES ARE CHINA AND THE PROBLEM OF COORDINATING COMMUNIST ACTIVITY. THOUGH EXPRESSED IDEOLOGICALLY, THESE ARE NATIONAL ISSUES OF THE UTMOST PRIORITY TO THE SOVIET UNION, RELATED TO SOVIET SECURITY IN THE EAST AND TO SOVIET HEGEMONY OVER ITS NEIGHBORS TO THE WEST. THE SOVIETS SEE AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONFERENCE AS ONE WAY OF DEALING WITH BOTH ISSUES. THE CURRENT SOVIET APPROACH TO CHINA IS TO ATTACK THE PRC'S PUBLIC STANCE WHERE IT IS VULNERABLE (CHILE, THE ME) AND TO ESTABLISH A RECORD

OF SOVIET REASONABLENESS (THE SOVIET OFFER OF NON-AGGRESSION AND NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATIES AND THE SOVIET RIVER BORDER PROPOSAL). IT IS NOT CLEAR AT THIS POINT HOW TREATMENT OF CHINA AT A COMMUNIST CONFERENCE CAN BE RECONCILED WITH THE WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION THE SOVIETS WOULD HOPE TO ATTRACT. MOSCOW WILL BE TAKING SOUNDINGS FROM REGIONAL SEMI-FINAL COMMUNIST MEETINGS (A WESTERN EUROPEAN MEETING IS SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY) AND POSSIBLY FROM A WARSAW PACT SUMMIT. AN ALL-EUROPEAN COMMUNIST MEETING MAY BE IN THE CARDS.

B. "PROGRESSIVE" MOVEMENTS. THE SOVIETS HAVE CLEARLY BEEN STUNG BY THE ARGUMENT -- HEARD, FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE ALGIERS NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE -- THAT THEY ARE JUST ANOTHER RICH NATION AND THAT THEIR PURSUIT OF DETENTE IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR CLAIM TO PROGRESSIVISM. PHETORIC ASIDE, HOWEVER, WE WOULD EXPECT THEM TO TAKE ACTIONS TO COUNTER SUCH CHARGES ONLY WHERE THERE IS LITTLE RISK TO THEIR FAR GREATER INTEREST IN DETENTE. THEIR RECOGNITION OF GUINEA-BISSAU AND THEIR SUSPENSION OF RELATIONS WITH THE CHILEAN JUNTA SPRANG FROM CONCERN ABOUT THEIR PROGRESSIVE CREDENTIALS. BUT ON TOUCHIER ISSUES -- \*LIKE CAMBODIA AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM -- THEIR SUPPORT FOR "NATIONAL  
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PA E 04 MOSCOW 15345 03 OF 04 101636Z

LIBERATION" IS LIKELY TO BE TEMPERED BY BROADER CONSIDERATIONS

C. MIDDLE EAST. SOVIET BEHAVIOR DURING THE ME CRISIS BROUGHT HOME THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AREA \*O MOSCOW. ITS \*GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION CLOSE TO SOVIET BORDERS AND \*ASTRI\*E THE MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL SEA ROUTE TO THE FAR EAST, THE POTENTIAL IT PROVIDES FOR MEDDLING WITH U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPEAN INTERESTS, AND THE LARGE SOVIET POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC INVESTMENT IN THE \*REGION HAVE BEEN TRADITIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF SOVIET INTEREST IN THE AREA. THESE FACTORS HAVE NOW BEEN REINFORCED BY MOSCOW'S PERCEPTION OF THE ME, DURING THE CURRENT CRISIS, AS A TESTING GROUND FOR ITS GREAT POWER CREDENTIALS. THIS IS A POWERFUL COMBINATION OF IMPERATIVES, AND WE SHOULD ASSUME THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL AGAIN TAKE MAJOR RISKS IF THEY SEEM NECESSARY FOR THE PROTECTION AND ADVANCEMENT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. MOSCOW MAY BE MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO MODERATING ITS BEHAVIOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST IF IT IS CONFIDENT THAT THE U.S. IS NOT TRYING TO DENY IT A MAJOR ROLE IN POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE AREA. BUT THE RAMIFICATIONS -- BOTH GLOBAL AND REGIONAL -- OF SUCH AN IMPLICIT IMPLEMENTATION OF A GREAT POWER "CONDOMINIUM" NEED TO BE STUDIED.

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 15345 04 OF 04 101639Z

51

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 15345 04 OF 04 101639Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 MOSCOW 15345

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SUBJ: YEAR-END ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICY

9. SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE ME LEAD TO A FINAL AND DISTURBING CONCLUSION ABOUT FUTURE SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN CONFRONTATION SITUATIONS. WE BELIEVE IT LIKELY, NOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ATTAINED VIRTUAL STRATEGIC PARITY WITH THE U.S., THAT SOME ELEMENTS IN THE LEADERSHIP ARE ALREADY, PERHAPS PREMATURELY, DEMANDING CONCRETE POLITICAL BENEFITS FROM THE IMPROVED STRATEGIC SITUATION. AT A MINIMUM THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A DIMINISHING SOVIET INCLINATION TO ACCEPT THAT CONFRONTATIONS SHOULD ALWAYS RESULT IN MOSCOW'S BLINKING. IT IS OBVIOUSLY BEYOND OUR CAPACITY TO KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT THIS SORT OF THINKING IS BEGINNING TO CRYSTALLIZE WITHIN THE POLITBURO. BUT WE SUSPECT THAT, WHILE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WILL BE NO LESS ANXIOUS TO AVOID CONFRONTATION SITUATIONS,\* IT MAY BE INCREASINGLY LESS WILLING TO BACK DOWN IF IT FINDS ITSELF IN ONE.

10. WE HAVE FOCUSED IN THIS ASSESSMENT MORE ON THE NEGATIVE POSSIBILITIES FOR THE FUTURE THAN ON THE POSITIVE ONES BECAUSE THE LATTER ARE WELL UNDERSTOOD. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP IS COMMITTED TO DEVELOPING LONG-TERM GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR A MUTUALLY USEFUL RELATIONSHIP ARE BETTER NOW THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE WORLD WAR II. THE U.S. SHOULD EXPLOIT THE OPPORTUNITY TO THE UTMOST, BECAUSE THERE ARE GREAT ADVANTAGES IN DETENTE ALSO FOR THE AMERICAN SIDE, NOTABLY NUCLEAR STABILIZATION AND THE PROMOTION OF SOVIET INWARD DEVELOPMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO EXPANSIONISM. BUT WE CANNOT COUNT ON THE INEVITABILITY OR IRREVERSIBILITY OF DETENTE. AND  
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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 15345 04 OF 04 101639Z

THE TENDENCY OF SOME ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET ESTABLISH-

MENT -- A TENDENCY WHICH IS NOT ALIEN TO BREZHNEV'S OWN PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL UPBRINGING -- TO VIEW U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPOSE THE COMMON DENOMINATOR OF OUR WILLS ON THE REST OF THE WORLD MUST OF COURSE BE COMBATTED. SOMETIMES THIS MAY REQUIRE STRONG MEDICINE, AS IN OCTOBER. BUT WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS NOT MONOLITHIC, AND WE SHOULD THEREFORE ADMINISTER BOTH STRONG MEDICINE AND ELIXIRS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO KEEP THE LESS FIRE-EATING ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET HIERARCHY IN GOOD HEALTH.

11. AMONG THE CHALLENGES POSED FOR U.S. POLICY BY THE PREDISPOSITION IN THE KREMLIN TOWARD GOOD RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON, THE FOLLOWING DESERVE EMPHASIS:

A. WE NEED TO FIND WAYS TO REINFORCE SOVIET INTEREST IN THE RELATIONSHIP BY CONSOLIDATING BILATERAL STEPS ALREADY TAKEN AND MOVING AHEAD TO BUILD UP THE VESTED INTEREST IN STABILITY AND COOPERATION. BY FOCUSING ON THE MUTUAL EXPLOITATION OF NON-RENEWABLE SOVIET RAW MATERIALS -- OIL, GAS, NICKEL, COPPER AND OTHER EXTRACTABLES, AS WELL AS TIMBER AND OTHER RESOURCES -- WE COULD BOTH RESPOND TO SOVIET EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST AND HELP MEET THE GROWING NEEDS OF THE U.S. ECONOMY. IN OUR OWN INTEREST THE U.S. SHOULD MOVE AHEAD TO OBTAIN APPROPRIATE LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS BEFORE THE RISING WORLD DEMAND FOR RAW MATERIALS ERODES SOVIET RECEPTIVITY. (THIS ASSUMES THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WOULD NOT ACCOUNT FOR A SUFFICIENTLY HIGH PROPORTION OF U.S. CONSUMPTION AS TO GIVE THE SOVIETS A SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC OR POLITICAL STRANGLEHOLD.)

B. WE FACE A SIMILAR, BUT MORE DIFFICULT, CHALLENGE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE. IN ADDITION TO THE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH WE ARE CAREFULLY WEIGHING IN ONGOING SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS SALT AND MBFR, OTHER POSSIBILITIES SHOULD BE STUDIED FOR REINFORCING AND EXPANDING THE APPLICATION OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT TO CONCRETE SITUATIONS. EMBARGO OR RESTRAINT OF ARMS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 15345 04 OF 04 101639Z

SHIPMENTS TO THE MIDDLE EAST IS ONE POSSIBILITY. WE MIGHT ALSO, FOR EXAMPLE, TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE QUESTION OF RESTRAINING SUPER-POWER PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. ABOVE ALL, HOWEVER, IT MUST CONTINUE TO BE MADE CLEAR TO MOSCOW THAT IT IS DANGEROUS AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO ATTEMPT TO TURN THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE U.S. OR OF ANY THIRD COUNTRY.DUBS

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